Simple coalitional games with beliefsSimple coalitional games with beliefs Πλήρης Δημοσίευση σε Συνέδριο Conference Full Paper 2015-10-012012enWe introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environ- ments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coali- tional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coali- tion structures. For simple games without coalition struc- tures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core non- emptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent inter- est. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/85-9021st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) ,Pasadena, USA Chalkiadakis Georgios Χαλκιαδακης Γεωργιος Edith Elkind Nicholas R. Jennings