Το έργο με τίτλο The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination από τον/τους δημιουργό/ούς Koenig, S., Tovey, C., Lagoudakis Michael, Markakis, V., Kempee, D., Keskinocak, Pınar, Kleyweg, A., Meyerson,A., Jain, S. διατίθεται με την άδεια Creative Commons Αναφορά Δημιουργού 4.0 Διεθνές
Βιβλιογραφική Αναφορά
S.Koenig, C.Tovey, M.G. Lagoudakis, V.Markakis, D.Kempee, P.Keskinocak, A.Kleywegt, A.Meyerson, and S.Jain. (2006 July). The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination.[Online]. Available: http://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/2006/AAAI06-266.pdf
Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than singlerobots, and auctions appear to be promising means forcoordinating them. In a recent paper at “Robotics: Scienceand Systems 2005,” we analyzed a coordinationsystem based on sequential single-item auctions. Weshowed that the coordination system is simple to implementand computation and communication efficient,and that the resulting sum of all travel distances inknown terrain is guaranteed to be only a constant factoraway from optimum. In this paper, we put these resultsin perspective by comparing our coordination systemagainst those based on either parallel single-itemauctions or combinatorial auctions, demonstrating thatit combines the advantages of both