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Simple coalitional games with beliefs

Chalkiadakis Georgios, Edith Elkind, Nicholas R. Jennings

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URIhttp://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/79DC6612-3D21-4D5A-9E15-AE6B4FE093ED-
Identifierhttp://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/Papers/scgbels.pdf-
Languageen-
Extent5 pagesen
TitleSimple coalitional games with beliefsen
CreatorChalkiadakis Georgiosen
CreatorΧαλκιαδακης Γεωργιοςel
CreatorEdith Elkinden
Creator Nicholas R. Jenningsen
Content SummaryWe introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environ- ments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coali- tional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coali- tion structures. For simple games without coalition struc- tures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core non- emptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent inter- est. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.en
Type of ItemΠλήρης Δημοσίευση σε Συνέδριοel
Type of ItemConference Full Paperen
Licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
Date of Item2015-10-01-
Date of Publication2012-
Bibliographic CitationG. Chalkiadakis, E.Elkind , N. R. Jennings.(2012).Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs .Presented at the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) ,Pasadena, USA.[online].Available : http://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/Papers/scgbels.pdfen

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