URI | http://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/79DC6612-3D21-4D5A-9E15-AE6B4FE093ED | - |
Αναγνωριστικό | http://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/Papers/scgbels.pdf | - |
Γλώσσα | en | - |
Μέγεθος | 5 pages | en |
Τίτλος | Simple coalitional games with beliefs | en |
Δημιουργός | Chalkiadakis Georgios | en |
Δημιουργός | Χαλκιαδακης Γεωργιος | el |
Δημιουργός | Edith Elkind | en |
Δημιουργός | Nicholas R. Jennings | en |
Περίληψη | We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environ- ments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coali- tional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coali- tion structures. For simple games without coalition struc- tures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core non- emptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent inter- est. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games. | en |
Τύπος | Πλήρης Δημοσίευση σε Συνέδριο | el |
Τύπος | Conference Full Paper | en |
Άδεια Χρήσης | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en |
Ημερομηνία | 2015-10-01 | - |
Ημερομηνία Δημοσίευσης | 2012 | - |
Βιβλιογραφική Αναφορά | G. Chalkiadakis, E.Elkind , N. R. Jennings.(2012).Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs .Presented at the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) ,Pasadena, USA.[online].Available : http://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/Papers/scgbels.pdf | en |