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Coalitional stability in structured environments

Chalkiadakis Georgios, Evangelos Markakis, Nicholas R. Jennings

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URI: http://purl.tuc.gr/dl/dias/B5805CEA-5F71-447F-B3EE-5F82E2C42A22
Year 2012
Type of Item Conference Poster
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Bibliographic Citation G. Chalkiadakis,E. Markakis,N. R. Jennings .(2012).Coalitional Stability in Structured Environments.Presented at the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.[onlline]. Available: http://pages.cs.aueb.gr/~markakis/research/aamas12-coop-graphs.pdf
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Summary

In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment con- strains the formation of coalitions among agents. Therefore, ex- amining the stability of formed coalition structures in such set- tings is of natural interest. We address this by considering core- stability within various models of cooperative games with struc- ture. First, we focus on characteristic function games defined on graphs that determine feasible coalitions. In particular, a coalition S can emerge only if S is a connected set in the graph. We study the (now modified) core, in which it suffices to check only feasi- ble deviations. Specifically, we investigate core non-emptiness as well as the complexity of computing stable configurations. We then move on to the more general class of (graph-restricted) partition function games, where the value of a coalition depends on which other coalitions are present, and provide the first stability results in this domain. Finally, we propose a “Bayesian” extension of parti- tion function games, in which information regarding the success of a deviation is provided in the form of a probability distribution de- scribing the possible reactions of non-deviating agents, and provide the first core-stability results in this model also.

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